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ABSTRACT 
We study the financing strategies of 191 start-ups after they have received venture 
capital (VC) and thereby contribute to the staging literature. The VC backed start-ups 
have raised financing on 345 occasions over a five-year period after the initial VC 
investment. Surprisingly, bank debt is the most important source of funding for these 
young and growth-oriented companies, supporting the view that VC investors have a 
certifying role in their portfolio companies. Bank debt is available to firms with a 
lower demand for money, lower levels of risk and of information asymmetries, 
implying that staging of equity funding is less important for these firms. A firm only 
raises equity when it’s debt capacity is exhausted, hinting that equity investors are 
investors of last resort. New equity is provided by the existing shareholders in 70% of 
the equity issues, supporting earlier findings that staged financing is important in 
venture capital financing. New shareholders invest when large amounts of funding are 
required and when risk and information asymmetries are high. We interpret these 
findings as support for the extended pecking order theory. In line with syndication 
arguments, new investors thus provide risk sharing opportunities and skills to screen 
and monitor and thereby reduce information asymmetries. New equity investors face 
adverse selection problems, however, in that only the most risky investments are 
syndicated.  
 
Keywords: financing strategy, venture capital, bank debt, external shareholders 
JEL classification: G32 
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Entrepreneurial companies need to access sufficient and adequate funding 
from external sources to pursue their value creating investment opportunities, as their 
internally generated cash flow is generally limited or negative. A critical question that 
they therefore face is whether to raise new funding under the form of debt or equity 
and, in the latter case, whether to raise equity from existing shareholders only or to 
involve new shareholders. This question is important, as entrepreneurial ventures are 
typically characterised by high risk and large information asymmetries and 
information opacities between the entrepreneur and capital providers (Berger and 
Udell, 1998). This makes that they are especially sensitive to problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Gompers, 1995). Moreover, entrepreneurial firms exhibit 
high probability of failure. The purpose of this study is to investigate empirically the 
financing choices of young,  growth-oriented firms after they received a first round of 
venture capital (VC). This setting allows us to focus on entrepreneurial companies 
that have been certified by VC investors as promising and high growth-oriented 
ventures.  
The 191 ventures in our sample raise substantial amounts of equity or debt on 
345 occasions over the five-year window after the initial VC investment. Each venture 
thus raises new financing on 1.8 occasions on average in this five-year time period. 
Surprisingly, bank debt is the most important source of funding for these young, 
growth oriented companies, especially for firms with lower demand for money, with 
lower levels of risk and lower levels of information asymmetries. Equity is only 
important for firms that have exhausted their debt capacity, hinting that equity 
investors are investors of last resort. Following Lemmon and Zender (2004), we 
interpret the findings as strong support for the extended pecking order theory.  
We further distinguish equity that is provided by existing shareholder only 
from equity that is provided by at least one new investor. External equity is provided 
by the existing shareholders in 70% of the equity issues, supporting earlier findings 
that staged financing is important in VC financing. New investors, being either VC 
firms or other equity investors, invest when larger amounts of funding are required 
and when risk and information asymmetries are highest. In line with syndication 
arguments, new equity investors thus provide risk sharing opportunities and reduce 
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information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and existing VC investors. New 
equity investors face adverse selection problems, however, in that only the most risky 
investments are syndicated. Existing investors are sole investors for intermediate 
levels of risk and information asymmetries. 
By focusing on the new issues of young, unquoted VC backed ventures, this 
study addresses a number of limitations of previous empirical research on 
entrepreneurial firm financing. First, most studies on unquoted companies deal with 
‘average’ start-ups or SMEs. In contrast, all firms in our sample have successfully 
appealed to VC investors at start-up. Therefore, our study addresses the financing 
choices of high growth-oriented companies. Further, the ‘average’ entrepreneur is 
often reluctant to issue equity to outside shareholders, because this may entail 
significant loss of independence and control. Hence, they truncate their financing 
options to internally generated cash flows and debt financing (Howorth, 2001). As the 
firms in our sample have all obtained VC early on, their shareholders are open to 
external equity financing and do not fear the loss of independence and control 
associated with it. Finally, the initial VC participation suggests that the entrepreneurs 
in our sample are relatively sophisticated in financing their venture (Van Auken, 
2001), as applying for venture capital is more difficult than applying for bank debt. 
This, again, broadens the financing options available to finance the venture.  The 
drawback of using a VC backed sample is that our findings may not be applicable to 
all entrepreneurial companies, as the VC participation early on may influence the 
search for and the availability of funding from different sources.  
A second contribution of the present study is that we study the financing 
strategy from the point of view of the entrepreneurial venture, rather than from the 
supply side. The few studies looking at the demand side, i.e. at how growth-oriented 
ventures are financed, often restrict themselves to follow-on equity financing (e.g. 
Gompers, 1995). Here, we not only include equity issues, but also bank debt as a 
financing source.  
2 INTRODUCTION 
Young, growth-oriented companies often develop products and ideas that 
require substantial capital, exceeding the internally generated cash flows or 
entrepreneur’s own funds (Berger and Udell, 1998). Entrepreneurial companies need 
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to access sufficient and adequate funding from external sources to pursue their 
opportunities. A critical question that they face is whether to raise new funding under 
the form of debt or equity and, in the latter case, whether to raise equity from the 
existing shareholders or to involve new shareholders. This question is important, as 
entrepreneurial ventures are typically characterised by high risk and large information 
asymmetries and information opacities between the entrepreneur and capital providers 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). This makes that they are especially sensitive to problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Gompers, 1995). Moreover, due to liabilities of 
newness and smallness, entrepreneurial firms exhibit high probability of failure. 
Investors may, therefore, ration capital and positive net present value projects may be 
denied financing, or companies may only be able to obtain certain types of funding 
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a). As a result, entrepreneurial ventures often face 
financing constraints that may lead to underinvestment problems (Hubbard, 1998) and 
thereby constrain growth (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002b).  
So far, our understanding of how early-stage ventures select among alternative 
financing sources at a given point in time and in a given context is limited. Studies on 
the financing choices of high potential ventures are scarce, mainly due to a lack of 
reliable data. The purpose of this study is to investigate empirically the financing 
choices of young,  growth-oriented firms after they received a first round of venture 
capital (VC). This setting allows us to focus on entrepreneurial companies that have 
been certified by VC investors as promising and high growth-oriented ventures. 
Drawing upon an extended version of the pecking order theory (Lemmon and Zender, 
2004), we use information asymmetry and risk arguments to develop hypotheses that 
explain how entrepreneurial companies select among bank debt or equity, from either 
existing shareholders or from new shareholders. New shareholders may be VC firms 
or other equity investors, such as corporations. We test the hypotheses on a unique 
hand-collected sample of 191 VC backed start-ups and we examine how these firms 
are financed during the first five years following the initial VC investment. 
The 191 ventures in our sample raise substantial amounts of equity or debt on 
345 occasions over the five-year window after the initial VC investment. Each venture 
thus raises new financing on 1.8 occasions on average in this five-year time period. 
Bank debt is the most important source of funding, especially for firms with lower 
demand for money, with lower levels of risk and lower levels of information 
asymmetries. Equity is only important for firms that have exhausted their debt 
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capacity, hinting that equity investors are investors of last resort. Following Lemmon 
and Zender (2004), we interpret the findings as strong support for the extended 
pecking order theory. 
We further distinguish equity provided by existing shareholder only from 
equity provided by at least one new investor. Equity is provided by the existing 
shareholders in 70% of the equity issues, supporting earlier findings that staged 
financing is important in VC financing. New investors, being either VC firms or other 
equity investors, invest when larger amounts of funding are required and when risk 
and information asymmetries are highest. In line with syndication arguments, new 
equity investors thus provide risk sharing opportunities and reduce information 
asymmetries between entrepreneurs and existing VC investors. New equity investors 
face adverse selection problems, however, in that only the most risky investments are 
syndicated. Existing investors are sole investors for intermediate levels of risk and 
information asymmetries. 
By focusing on the new issues of young, unquoted VC backed ventures, this 
study addresses a number of limitations of previous empirical research on 
entrepreneurial firm financing. This study differs from most previous studies in the 
type of firms and the type of data that are examined. First, most studies on unquoted 
companies deal with ‘average’ start-ups or SMEs. In contrast, all firms in our sample 
have successfully appealed to VC investors at start-up. Therefore, our study addresses 
the financing choices of high growth-oriented companies, as it is well established that 
VC firms try to select the most promising ventures through extensive pre-investment 
screening and due diligence (Amit et al., 1998; Manigart and Sapienza, 1999). 
Further, the ‘average’ entrepreneur is often reluctant to issue equity to VCs, because 
this entails significant loss of independence and control. Through their seats in the 
board of directors, venture capitalists take part in strategic decision making (Fried et 
al., 1998; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004). Therefore, entrepreneurs are often reluctant 
to raise equity and hence, truncate their financing options to the use of internally 
generated cash flows and debt financing (Howorth, 2001). Our sample of VC backed 
firms thus allows to examine financing decisions of entrepreneurs that do not 
constrain the growth of their firms to the availability of internal funds or to debt 
financing. Finally, the initial VC participation suggests that the entrepreneurs in our 
sample are relatively sophisticated in financing their venture (Van Auken, 2001), as 
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applying for equity is more difficult than applying for bank debt. This, again, 
broadens the financing options available to finance the start-up.  
The drawback of using a VC backed sample is that our findings may not be 
applicable to all entrepreneurial companies, as the VC participation early on may 
influence the search for and the availability of funding from different sources. For 
example, VCs may have a certifying role. The presence of VC may provide credibility 
and legitimacy to the entrepreneurial firm, making them more attractive to other 
investors. Moreover, VC is available to only a limited number of companies; 
numerous high growth companies were never financed with VC. Our findings 
therefore do not extend to non-VC backed high growth companies. 
A second contribution of the present study is that we study the financing 
strategy from the point of view of the entrepreneurial venture. A limitation of the 
existing literature is that most studies on VC financing study the supply side, i.e. how 
VC firms select and manage their portfolio companies. The few studies looking at the 
demand side, i.e. at how growth-oriented ventures are financed, often restrict 
themselves to follow-on equity financing (e.g. Gompers, 1995). Here, we not only 
include equity issues, but also bank debt as a financing source. Our data thus allow to 
address issues related to the full spectrum of follow-on financing, including issues 
related to staging and syndication of VC funding, as the ventures develop. We thereby 
address the call of Gompers (1995) for more studies on how appropriate sources of 
capital change as new firms evolve. 
A third contribution of this study is that all firms in the sample are between 
one and seven years old and unquoted, while most studies focus on post-IPO 
financing (for example Hovakimian et al., 2001). This introduces a bias in the latter 
towards more mature, more successful and larger firms, which typically face less 
financing constraints compared to young ventures. This also implies that our study 
does not suffer from survivor bias. Unlike most studies, surviving, acquired and 
failing firms are included in our analyses. This allows us to eliminate a positive 
survivor bias that may be important for this type of firms (Manigart et al., 2002a) and 
increases the validity of the results. Finally, we focus on Continental European firms 
rather than on US firms which constitute the sample frame of the majority of 
empirical studies on firms’ financing decisions. This allows us to examine financing 
decisions in a bank oriented financial and institutional setting, in contrast to most 
studies.  
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Finally, our study further differs from most studies on firm financing in the 
method that is used. First, we focus on the impact of firm characteristics on 
entrepreneurs’ financing choices at a particular point in time, and not on the firm’s 
debt ratio, which is a static picture of a firm’s complete history of financing choices 
(de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003). This approach has major advantages. Because young, 
high potential firms may change considerably over relatively short time frames, this 
may affect the availability and suitability of different financing sources (Berger and 
Udell, 1998). It is therefore important to take into account firm characteristics at the 
moment new funding is obtained.  By studying new financing issues, information on 
the timing of these issues is taken into account (de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003). 
Finally, although important differences exist between internally generated funds and 
external equity in terms of asymmetric information, this distinction is typically not 
made when studying debt ratios (de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003). Second, we follow 
the call of Schwartz and Teach (2000) in that we examine firms’ financing choices in 
a dynamic, longitudinal way, contrary to cross sectional studies. Firms are followed 
from the year after VC participation up to five years after participation or until the 
firm ceases to exist as an independent venture due to take-over, liquidation or 
bankruptcy. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Hypotheses with respect to the 
choice between bank debt and equity are developed in section 2. We make a 
distinction between existing and new equity investors. Section 3 presents the sample 
and describes the data collection. Section 4 presents a dynamic picture of how the 
start-ups in our sample are financed after the initial VC investment. Section 5 
describes the method of analysis and defines the variables used in further analyses. 
Section 6 reports the bivariate and multivariate results. Finally, section 7 discusses the 
results and concludes. 
3 THE CHOICE BETWEEN BANK DEBT, EQUITY FROM EXISTING 
SHAREHOLDERS AND EQUITY FROM NEW SHAREHOLDERS 
In this section, we develop hypotheses as to why some entrepreneurial 
ventures are financed with bank debt, whereas others raise equity. We present 
theoretical arguments that explain why certain ventures issue equity to new 
shareholders, rather than to existing ones. We first focus on the role of information 
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asymmetries. Thereafter, we focus on bankruptcy risk and limited debt capacity to 
explain financing choices.  We address the financing question from the supply side 
(debt or equity investors) and from the demand side, including the entrepreneurs and 
the VCs that initially invested in the venture.1   
3.1 Information asymmetries and agency problems 
The difficulties of young ventures in securing sufficient and adequate external 
financing are often attributed to information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and 
financiers (Berger and Udell, 1998), which may lead to agency problems such as 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Eisenhardt, 1989). Following the pecking order 
theory, concerns with respect to asymmetric information and potential agency 
problems are expected to affect the financing choices of VC backed start-ups in the 
financing rounds following the initial VC investment. Investors differ in how they 
deal with agency problems, making certain types of investors more appropriate 
depending on the firm’s characteristics (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a). 
Entrepreneurial ventures, on the other hand, will consider the signalling effect and the 
ability of investors to generate information on the venture when seeking outside 
funding.  
3.1.1 Bank debt versus equity 
Pecking order theory asserts that information asymmetries and potential 
agency problems affect the supply of financing for any company. Equity investors 
have, in comparison to banks, more incentives and are often better equipped to 
mitigate substantial information problems associated with entrepreneurial ventures 
(Ueda, 2004), thereby creating an informational advantage and reducing potential 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. First, the equity nature of their claims 
incites them to reduce information asymmetries (Wright and Robbie, 1998). In 
contrast to bank debt, which involves a fixed claim restricted to interest and principal 
payments, equity entails a claim on the firm’s residual income. Hence, equity 
investors have a more powerful incentive to deal with the asymmetric information 
                                                           
1
 We largely draw upon the venture capital literature and to a smaller extent on the business angel 
literature to explain the choice for equity.  We point to the fact, however, that although most equity 
investors in these ventures are VC firms or business angels, other equity investors also play a role in 
the financing of entrepreneurial ventures.  These may, for example, be corporate investors. 
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problems of entrepreneurial ventures than banks providing debt as the formers’ return 
potential depends on a firm’s value creation,. 
Second, although theoretical and empirical work in the banking literature 
stresses the role of bank screening, contracting and monitoring in reducing 
asymmetric information problems, the processes and instruments typically used by 
banks do not always work in the context of early stage, high potential ventures. The 
screening process of banks focuses mainly on historical financial information, making 
bank financing especially appropriate for firms with a positive financial history 
(Rosman and O'Neill, 1993). However, historical financial information is not always 
available, let alone positive, for young, high potential ventures (Berger and Udell, 
1998). Relationship lending is another mechanism typically used by banks to reduce 
problems stemming from information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and banks 
(Boot, 2000). Again, because their credit history may be limited or even inexistent, 
young, entrepreneurial ventures may not be able to benefit from relationship lending.  
Furthermore, banks typically use collateral, guarantees and debt covenants to 
deal with information problems (Berger and Udell, 1998). Collateralization allows 
banks to deal with problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, as it protects the 
interests of the bank and limits the decisions of the entrepreneur. However, young, 
high potential ventures often lack assets that may serve as collateral for bank debt 
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a; Cassar, 2004). Their investments are often intangible 
and relate to growth opportunities (Baeyens et al., 2003). The lack of a positive 
financial history and of a lending relationship with banks, combined with low levels 
of collateralizable assets and investments in growth opportunities rather than in 
tangible assets, make that information asymmetries in these type of firms are high 
(Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a). Entrepreneurs are often better informed than 
financial intermediaries about the riskiness of their projects, thus creating problems of 
adverse selection. Indeed, banks may choose to ration credit instead of exerting more 
efforts to decrease information asymmetries or increasing interest rates (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981)2.  
 
                                                           
2
 In contrast to the model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), which leads to underinvestment, the model of 
asymmetric information of de Meza and Webb (1987) leads to overlending. However, consistent with 
the ideas of Carpenter and Petersen (2002a), we believe that overlending is unlikely to occur in 
entrepreneurial ventures. 
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One of the primary reasons for the existence of informed equity investors such 
as VC firms or business angels is their information processing capacities (Amit et al., 
1998). These investors are able to exert more costly efforts, given that they share in 
the potential upside of their portfolio companies. The information processing of VC 
firms and business angels focuses more on strategic information rather than on past 
financial information. They engage in extensive due diligence activities, including the 
collection of information about the business, the market in which the venture operates, 
and the entrepreneur or start-up team (Manigart et al., 1997). As a result, they are 
better equipped to screen early stage ventures (Rosman and O'Neill, 1993). Extensive 
screening is also done by corporate investors, wishing to invest for strategic reasons 
or to have a window on technology.  Intensive screening before the funds are provided 
allows equity investors to reduce information asymmetries and addresses the 
problems of adverse selection. Moral hazard problems are addressed by closely 
monitoring the firm as soon as funds are provided (Lerner, 1995). 
An additional method used by equity investors – especially VC firms - to 
hedge against moral hazard is to write tailor-made contracts (Sahlman, 1990) and to 
stage the funding. A tailor-made contract reduces goal incongruence between 
entrepreneurs and investors (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004; Sahlman, 1990) for 
example by using convertible instruments (Gompers, 1998). Staging implies that 
equity investors commit themselves to further invest if pre-defined milestones are 
met. Conversely, this gives the equity investors an option to abandon the venture if it 
does not perform as expected (Gompers, 1995). Staging is considered to be one of the 
strongest control mechanisms used by VC investors and business angels as it provides 
a powerful incentive for the entrepreneur to perform well (Sahlman, 1990). Gompers 
(1995) shows that the number of financing rounds of VC backed ventures increases 
and the duration between financing rounds decreases as asymmetric information 
problems and potential agency costs increase. Hence, he shows that staging becomes 
more important when the value of monitoring increases. Based on staging arguments, 
a first round of VC funding is more likely to be followed by another equity round 
rather than by debt in firms with more important information asymmetries and 
potential agency costs. 
Foregoing supply side arguments suggest that the relation between information 
asymmetries and the supply of bank debt and equity is motivated by the nature of the 
investors’ claims and their screening, contracting and monitoring techniques. Based 
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on these arguments, we expect that firms with higher information asymmetries are 
more likely to be financed by equity, rather than by bank debt (Cassar, 2004).  
Demand side arguments lead to the same expectation, as entrepreneurs trade 
off the relative costs of funding against its benefits. On the one hand, equity funding is 
an expensive financing source. For example, required rates of return of European VC 
investors vary between 15% and 55% depending on the stage of development of the 
investee company (Manigart et al., 2002b). Everything else equal, firms are likely to 
prefer funding from cheaper sources, such as bank financing. However, equity 
funding, especially from VCs, is associated with important advantages in terms of 
information production, signalling, certification and post-investment value adding. 
When information asymmetries increase and hence, the relative benefits of informed 
equity become more important, the relative cost of informed equity decreases and 
firms may opt for equity instead of bank debt (Fulghieri and Lukin, 2001) 3. 
The demand for bank debt may finally be driven by the VC as shareholder of 
the venture. A VC firm’s return potential increases if the total funding requirement of 
the venture can be split between equity (provided by the VC) and bank debt. VC firms 
will therefore push firms to obtain bank debt when it is available, thus when 
information asymmetries are low. 
 
Based on supply and demand related arguments, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1: VC backed companies with lower levels of information 
asymmetries are more likely to be financed with bank debt instead of equity. 
3.1.2 Existing versus new equity investors 
Information asymmetries and potential agency problems may not only affect 
the choice between bank debt and equity, but also the choice between different 
providers of equity. Previous studies have suggested that information asymmetries 
                                                           
3
 All the firms in this study get VC early on. This may have reduced to some extent the asymmetric 
information problems that they face and their need to signal firm quality to outsiders. Indeed, the initial 
VC investment may convey positive information (certification) and should lead to more financing from 
other, cheaper sources (Manigart and Sapienza, 1999). Hence, the first VC funding round may have 
improved their ability to get bank funding for certain firms. However, concerns with respect to 
information asymmetries, and the agency costs associated with it, may nevertheless continue to play an 
important role in their financing choices (Janney and Folta, 2003). 
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and the resulting need for effective selection and monitoring by outside investors lead 
established firms to choose private equity over public equity (for example Janney and 
Folta, 2003). Similarly, the existence of information asymmetries may play an 
important role in the choice of young ventures between external equity from new or 
from existing shareholders. 
Information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and investors induce growth-
oriented ventures to incur important information production costs in order to secure 
sufficient and adequate financing from outside investors. In the financial growth cycle 
paradigm, firms’ financing sources change as firms develop: young firms with 
important information asymmetries mainly rely on inside financing sources, while 
outside financing becomes more important as problems of asymmetric information are 
smaller (Berger and Udell, 1998). First round VC investors are insiders and are thus 
typically better informed than new investors on the firm’s investment opportunities 
(Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994). Thus, by selling new shares to existing shareholders 
rather than to new shareholders, firms are able to reduce the costs of information 
production. By focusing on existing investors, firms further avoid the search costs of 
looking for new investors. 
Next to the argument that producing information may be costly, the degree of 
sensitivity of the private information may also impact the choice of investor. Yosha 
(1995) argues that the financing choices of entrepreneurial firms are likely to be 
influenced by their attempt to avoid the disclosure of sensitive, private information. 
Firms with important growth options, and hence large information asymmetries, may 
choose to limit the number of informed investors in order to reduce the risk that 
proprietary information leaks to competitors. Therefore, firms with a lot of sensitive 
private information are expected to sell their new equity to existing shareholders 
rather than to new investors. Based on the above arguments, we propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: VC backed companies with higher levels of information 
asymmetries are more likely to be financed with equity from existing investors 
rather than from new investors. 
 
However, the opposite relation may be true. Inviting new shareholders to 
invest in a venture relates to a decision to syndicate a deal. Following the VC 
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syndication literature, there are supply side arguments to explain the syndication 
decision. Information production is higher when new investors are invited as 
shareholder, which is especially valuable when information asymmetries are high.  
First, existing VC investors may invite colleagues to co-invest in order to help them to 
better assess the investment decision (Lerner, 1994) or to better manage the portfolio 
companies after the investment (Brander et al., 2002; Wright and Lockett, 2003). 
Screening by new investors allows existing shareholders to make better reinvestment 
decisions (Birmingham et al., 2003). Existing shareholders have to decide whether or 
not to reinvest in the firm in each financing round. Although investors from prior 
rounds are expected to be better informed compared to outsiders (Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1994), they may still experience some asymmetric information problems 
related to the further development of the portfolio company (Wright and Robbie, 
1998). New investors bring along new skills to evaluate and screen firms and hence 
further reduce information asymmetries (Lerner, 1995). They may bring up new 
information and provide a fresh, unbiased perspective on the prospects of the venture 
that is not influenced by an escalation of commitment (Birmingham et al., 2003). 
Therefore, the willingness of new investors to finance the venture signals to existing 
investors that it is economically rational to reinvest. Bringing in skilled outsiders is an 
especially valuable strategy when information asymmetries are more important 
(Meuleman et al., 2005), enabling existing VC investors to make better reinvestment 
decisions.  
Next to improving investment decisions, new investors may play a positive 
role in enhancing the existing investors’ monitoring and value adding capabilities. 
Previous studies have stressed the role of monitoring as a mechanism to alleviate 
problems with external equity financing under asymmetric information (Wright and 
Robbie, 1998; Manigart and Sapienza, 1999). Early stage companies have different 
monitoring and value adding needs compared to later stage companies.  Given the 
development of the firm, the skills of early stage investors may not be adequate any 
more and they may benefit from specialised capabilities of new VC investors (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2004). 
Improved selection, monitoring and value-adding activities are particularly 
important in firms with important information asymmetries and agency problems 
(Gompers, 1995). Hence, it will be beneficial for the initial VC investors to invite new 
investors to co-invest when information asymmetries are more important.  
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Foregoing arguments to understand the syndication decision are developed 
from the point of view of the initial VC investor. There are also arguments that relate 
to the entrepreneur, however: inviting new investors may be especially beneficial for 
the entrepreneurial firm or the entrepreneur when information asymmetries are 
important. When existing investors are the only ones providing follow-on financing, 
their negotiation power is high and may lead them to bankroll the entrepreneur. When 
the entrepreneur is wealth constrained and therefore unable to co-invest along with the 
VC, the latter’s negotiation power may lead the entrepreneur having to accept a low 
valuation and therefore to face high dilution. Bringing in new investors gives an 
unbiased estimate of the value of the venture, thereby protecting the entrepreneur 
from reverse agency problems induced by initial VC investors (Admati and Pfleiderer, 
1994). Again, agency problems are more likely to arise when information 
asymmetries are high. Bringing in new investors alongside existing investors may 
thus be stimulated by the entrepreneurs, wishing to reduce agency problems with the 
initial VC investors.  
Adding new investors may not only solve the agency problem entrepreneurs 
may face vis-à-vis their initial VC investors, but it may also enhance the value of the 
entrepreneurial firm. New information on the firms’ prospects is generated when new 
investors are added. Hence, firms with important information asymmetries may 
choose to obtain financing from new shareholders in order to stimulate information 
production (Fulghieri and Lukin, 2001).  thereby not only reducing information 
asymmetries, but also enhancing value and reducing the dilution that entrepreneurs 
face. New investors may further bring in new resources and thereby enhance the value 
adding capabilities and legitimacy of the entrepreneurial firm. For example, 
international shareholders may have a better view on market prospects in the 
investors’ home markets,  or may be beneficial in providing legitimacy and networks 
in their home markets. This may be important for entrepreneurial ventures wishing to 
internationalize.  Foregoing supply and demand side arguments lead to the opposite 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: VC backed companies with higher levels of information 
asymmetries are more likely to be financed with equity from new investors, 
instead of existing investors. 
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3.2 Bankruptcy risk and limited debt capacity 
Next to information asymmetries and associated agency risks, the financing of VC 
backed start-ups may be explained by other risk considerations. Supply and demand 
of debt is expected to be influenced by concerns about both costs and probability of 
financial distress. This is particularly important for young, high potential ventures. 
First, the costs of financial distress are expected to be high for growth-oriented firms, 
as they often possess a lot of specific assets with low liquidation value (Opler and 
Titman, 1994). Second, young, growth-oriented ventures typically face important 
challenges, threatening their survival. Due to liabilities of newness and smallness, 
young firms are more prone to financial distress. VC backed ventures have been 
found to exhibit even higher failure rates, compared to other early-stage ventures 
(Manigart et al., 2002a). Even if financial distress does not lead to liquidation, 
entrepreneurial ventures may still incur indirect financial distress costs. These costs 
include, for example, suboptimal investment decisions, lost sales, high employee 
turnover or less generous supplier credit (Altman, 1984). We argue that risk 
considerations may affect both the choice between bank debt and equity and the 
choice between existing and new equity investors. We further consider the role of 
limited debt capacity in the choice between bank debt and equity. 
3.2.1 Bank debt versus equity 
The use of debt involves fixed payments; failure to make these payments leads 
to default and may potentially result in bankruptcy. Banks do not share the firm’s 
upside potential and are therefore particularly concerned about downside risk. Banks 
ration credit to firms with high default and bankruptcy risk, thereby limiting firms’ 
capacity to get additional debt (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a). Maximum debt 
capacity is described as a situation in which the costs of additional debt become so 
high that there are important limitations on additional debt issues (Chirinko and 
Singha, 2000). The role of debt capacity in understanding how firms choose between 
debt and equity has recently been stressed recently (Lemmon and Zender, 2004; 
Chirinko and Singha, 2000). Once a firm’s debt capacity is exhausted, it has to turn to 
equity to finance their investment projects. As such, equity investors can be 
considered as investors of last resort (Chirinko and Singha, 2000). Lemmon and 
Zender (2004) hereby reconcile the traditional pecking order theory with the 
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observation that certain types of firms, such as young and high tech firms, rely heavily 
on equity financing. They argue that empirical evidence is in line with the pecking 
order theory, once limitations on debt capacity are taken into account. Thus, firms 
with higher bankruptcy risk and a debt level that is close to its maximum debt 
capacity will be denied bank debt and will hence be forced to turn to equity investors, 
even if their current debt position is low.  This interpretation is labeled the “extended 
pecking order theory”. 
In contrast to banks, equity investors may be willing to provide financing to 
firms with relatively high risk of bankruptcy, as they share in the firms’ upside 
potential. Equity investors are not so much in the business of dealing with risk, but in 
that of enhancing value through increasing returns in high growth environments 
(Manigart and Sapienza, 1999). This is not to say that equity investors do not hedge 
against investment risk. Staged financing may help in dealing with financial risk 
(Kaplan and Strömberg, (2004). Rather than investing the total amount at once, 
staging allows investors to limit the initial amount of funding at risk and allows to 
more quickly abandon projects that head towards failure. This is important since 
entrepreneurs have no incentives to stop investing in a failing project as long as others 
put up the money for continuation (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994). Hence, based on 
staging arguments, it is expected that a first round of VC funding is more likely to be 
followed by another equity round, rather than by a debt round, when bankruptcy risk 
is important. 
A negative relation between bankruptcy risk and the use of debt is also 
consistent with demand considerations. Firm survival is an important concern for 
entrepreneurs, therefore entrepreneurs of firms that face a high probability and/or 
costs of financial distress are less likely to use debt. Based on the above arguments, 
we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: VC backed companies with higher bankruptcy risk are more 
likely to be financed with equity, instead of bank debt; 
 
Hypothesis 3b: VC backed companies with lower debt capacity are more 
likely to be financed with equity, instead of bank debt. 
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3.2.2 Existing versus new equity investors 
Arguments related to risk sharing may explain why some VC backed start-ups get 
equity from new shareholders in further equity rounds, whereas existing investors 
provide additional equity in other firms. Risk sharing implies that new investors are 
sought to (co-)finance investments with high default and bankruptcy risk, allowing the 
initial VC investors to better diversify their portfolio (Manigart et al., 2005). The 
decision of existing investors to invest, either by co-investing with new investors or 
alone, depends on how the investment contributes to the investors’ overall portfolio 
risk. Assuming that the contribution of an investment to the investors’ portfolio risk is 
positively associated with the risk of the portfolio firm (Brander et al., 2002), risk 
sharing arguments imply that high-risk firms are (co-)financed by new investors. For 
example, Brander et al (2002) find that the variability of returns is higher for 
syndicated investments, in comparison with stand-alone investments, suggesting that 
high-risk investments are syndicated more often. The risk sharing motive has been 
found to be more important to explain syndication than improved selection and value 
adding motives in Europe (Manigart et al., 2005; Wright and Lockett, 2003). Based on 
these arguments, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: VC backed companies with higher bankruptcy risk are more 
likely to be financed with equity from new investors, instead of existing 
investors. 
4 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION AND DATA COLLECTION 
Foregoing hypotheses are tested on a sample of unquoted, young Belgian VC 
backed companies. In contrast with the U.S. where most studies on firms’ financing 
decisions have been done, Belgium has a Continental European financial system. 
While U.S. firms obtain an important share of their external financing from capital 
markets, this financing source is considerably less important for European firms. As 
in most countries, only a minority of Belgian firms are quoted on a stock exchange. In 
contrast, European firms rely to a large extent on bank loans (Hartmann et al., 2003). 
The VC industry, however, is quite well developed in Belgium. Belgian venture 
capital investors are quite active in early stage and in high tech investments compared 
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to their European colleagues (EVCA, 1987-2003). Still, the role of the VC industry in 
financing firms remains limited: in the period 1996 – 2000, for example, investments 
made by Belgian VC companies accounted for only 3.3% of the net issuance of 
unlisted equities by Belgian firms (ECB, 2002). 
Our sample of VC backed start-up companies is a unique, hand-collected 
sample, gathered from secondary sources. Yearly accounts of VC firms, press 
clippings, press releases and websites are used to identify start-ups that received VC 
between 1987 and 1997. A start-up company is defined as a company that is at most 2 
years old at the time of its first VC funding. This sampling procedure yields a sample 
of 191 high potential start-up companies, covering 40% of all Belgian VC backed 
start-ups that received VC during that period (EVCA) (see Table 1 – Panel A). Table 
1 – Panel B shows the industry distribution of the sample firms using 1-digit NACE 
code4. One quarter of the firms in our sample are active in NACE industry 8 
(“Business services”), 20% in NACE industry 3 (“Metal manufacture; mechanical and 
instrument engineering”) and 17% in NACE industry 6 (“Distributive trades, hotels, 
catering, repairs”).  
Insert Table 1 about here 
Data on the sample firms are collected from several sources. First, we use the 
yearly financial accounts of the companies, from the year after the investment up to at 
most 5 years after the initial investment or until the company is liquidated, bankrupt 
or acquired. All Belgian companies are required to file annual financial statements 
with the National Bank of Belgium. More than 50 variables from the financial 
accounts (balance sheet, profit and loss statement) are recorded. For each company 
year, information is available on the use of bank debt and external equity financing. 
Next to the financial statements, information on the investors in follow-on equity 
rounds is collected manually through press clippings, press releases and websites. 
Moreover, statutory required publications with respect to capital increases, published 
in ‘Het Belgisch Staatsblad/Le Moniteur Belge’5 are screened for investor 
                                                           
4
 Firms active in the financial sector and holding companies are excluded from the sample. 
5
 ‘The Belgian Law Gazette’ 
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information. We further use the Belfirst CD-ROM, containing information on 
shareholder structure.  
5 FINANCING CHOICES OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL START-UPS IN 
OUR SAMPLE 
Given that little is known on the follow-on financing of young, entrepreneurial 
companies, we start with describing extensively to what extent the companies in our 
sample raise external financing after the initial VC funding and which types of 
financing are issued: bank debt, equity from new shareholders or equity from existing 
shareholders (Table 2). Following Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) and de Haan 
and Hinlopen (2003), an issue is defined as a net external equity or bank debt increase 
that amounts to at least 5% of pre-issue total assets6. We do not make a distinction 
between long-term and short-term bank debt. Both the number of issues and the 
amounts of funding, recorded per year after initial VC investment, are shown in Table 
2 (Panels A and B). Equity issues are split according to whether new shareholders, 
existing shareholders or both invest in the firm (Table 2 – Panel C). Further, we 
provide a description of the number of issues per firm within the first five years after 
initial VC participation (Table 2 – Panel D). Finally, firms are classified based on 
whether they issue only equity, only debt or a combination of both during the 
observation period (Table 2 – Panel E). 
Insert Table 2 – Panels A, B, C, D and E about here 
The 191 ventures in our sample have together raised equity or debt on 345 
occasions in the five years following the initial VC investment. A sample firm thus 
raises on average 1.8 times new money for an average amount of € 3 502 693. Table 2 
- Panel A reports issues by year after the initial VC participation. This panel illustrates 
the continued need for external funding by the start-ups in our sample. 29% of the 
firms obtain new funding during the first year after VC investment, while as much as 
half of the sample firms raise equity or debt in the second year after VC investment. 
More than one third of the firms raise external financing in year 3 or year 4, whereas 
                                                           
6
 The 5% threshold percentage is used in order to focus on substantial security issues. 
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one quarter of the firms raises new equity or debt in the fifth year after VC. This hints 
that raising money is particularly important shortly after having received VC, but the 
initial VC investment allows many companies to bridge the first year. After a couple 
of years, internally generated cash flows seem to be sufficient to finance the further 
growth of a majority of the ventures. Table 2 – Panel A shows moreover that the 
sample firms more often raise bank debt than equity: 67% of the new issues (230 out 
of 345 issues) are bank debt issues, compared to 33% equity rounds (115 out of 345 
issues). Debt financing is thus important, even for early stage ventures. 
Of the 191 ventures, only 143 (75%) have raised equity, debt or both at least 
once in the five years following the initial VC investment. Conversely, 48 VC backed 
start-up companies (25%) do not raise funding in the observation period. The 
additional financing of these firms thus solely consists of internally generated cash 
flows. The non-issuing firms invest less in fixed assets compared to firms that raise 
external financing. This may either be due to a lack of supply of external funding, 
which may restrict their investments to the availability of internally generated funds, 
or a lower demand for external funding, due to a lack of value creating investment 
projects or high cash flow generation. The lack of external funding does not lead to 
higher failure rates, however. Of the 48 non-issuing firms, 12 firms (25%) fail within 
the first 5 years after the initial VC participation, compared to 24 firms that do issue 
follow-on financing (17% of the issuing sample). None of the non-issuing firms is 
involved in a merger, while 4 issuing firms are involved in a merger7.  
Since the focus of this study is on the determinants of follow-on financing and 
the choice between bank debt and equity from existing or new investors, the initial 
sample is reduced to firms that do get new bank debt or equity. Table 2 – Panel B 
presents the median and total amounts that are raised in equity and bank debt issues. 
The 143 ventures have raised a total of € 1.2 billion over the five-year period or on 
average € 8 450 552 per firm. More than € 400 million is raised as equity, while banks 
have provided almost € 800 million or almost twice the amount of equity. This again 
stresses the importance of bank debt for VC backed companies. However, the median 
equity investment (€ 495 787) is larger than the median debt investment (€ 373 353). 
It is remarkable that the largest median and total amounts of bank debt are raised in 
the very first year after having received the initial VC investment. This may hint that 
                                                           
7
 In order not to introduce a bias caused by the merger, these firms are excluded from the analyses from 
the year of the merger onwards. 
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the initial VC funding round has improved the ability of firms to get bank funding. 
Indeed, the mere presence of a venture capitalist in the start-up of a firm may have 
sent a positive signal to other investors, thereby certifying the venture and improving 
its availability to raise cheaper funding (Manigart and Sapienza, 1999). This also 
supports the argument that VC firms invest as little as possible in order to enhance 
their return prospects. After the first year, the importance of bank debt declines 
steadily. This is not the case for the equity issues, however. The median amount of 
equity raised remains rather constant, but the total amount of equity raised by the 
sample firms declines over time. This is, of course, partly due to the fact that more 
than a quarter of the firms have disappeared after 5 years due to acquisitions, 
liquidations or bankruptcies. 
Table 2 – Panel C reports the distribution of the equity issues split by existing 
or new investors. 77 firms in our sample are involved in 115 equity rounds. 11 of 
them raise only equity, while the remainder raise combinations of equity and bank 
debt. We have data on the identity of the equity investors for more than 75% (90) of 
the equity issues. In particular, we know whether the issues where financed by 
existing shareholders only, by new shareholders only or whether both existing and 
new shareholders invested. 69% (62) of the equity issues for which we have investor 
data are financed by existing shareholders only. 13 out of 90 issues are financed by 
new shareholders, whereas 15 issues are financed both by existing and by new 
shareholders. This implies that about 31% of the equity issues involve at least one 
new investor. It should be noted that the new shareholders are not necessarily other 
VC firms. On the contrary, new VC firms are involved in only 9 out of the 28 issues 
with at least one new investor.  
Table 2 – Panel D presents the number of equity and bank debt issues per firm 
within the first 5 years after initial VC participation. The results show that more than 
70% of the issuing firms raise new financing on more than one occasion. About one 
third of the firms get new funding twice, and 30% of the issuers receive three or four 
times new funding within the first 5 years. Finally, 10% of the issuing firms obtain 
additional financing on five or more occasions. This indicates that the initial VC 
participation does not fully cover the further external financing needs of the young, 
high potential ventures in our sample. This is consistent with theories on staging VC. 
Table 2 – Panel E shows that 46% of the issuing firms do not get further 
equity funding within the first 5 years after the initial VC participation, but issue only 
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bank debt. These firms account for 31% (108 of 345) of all financing events. Only 8% 
of the issuing firms in our sample get equity only. Most firms that issue equity within 
the first 5 years also raise bank debt at least once: 66 firms or 46% of the issuing firms 
obtain both bank debt and equity, representing 65% of all issues (224 of 345 issues). 
The first issue after initial VC participation of 35 firms is a simultaneous debt and 
equity issue. 16 firms issue bank debt first, while the remaining 15 firms issue equity 
first. These results show that about half of the young, high potential ventures in our 
sample rely on debt only, while most of the other firms use a combination of bank 
debt and equity to finance further growth. Almost none rely solely on equity. 
In this section, we have shown that the initial VC participation does not fully 
cover the further external financing needs of the young high potential ventures in our 
sample. A majority of the firms in our sample gets additional external funding, often 
on more than one occasion. About half of the issuing firms rely solely on debt, while 
most of the other firms use a combination of bank debt and equity to finance further 
growth. Firms in our sample raise more often bank debt, rather than equity. Moreover, 
the total amount of debt raised is almost twice the total amount of equity raised. 
However, this does not imply that follow-on equity funding and staging does not play 
an important role in the financing of the equity issuing entrepreneurial firms: equity 
issues are substantially larger than bank debt issues. Firms that obtain additional 
equity funding are often financed by existing investors. New shareholders are sought 
in only one third of the equity issues. Bringing in new investors is thus not a common 
event for the VC backed ventures in our sample. 
6 VARIABLES AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS 
6.1 Method of analysis 
So far, we have presented a dynamic picture of how VC backed start-ups are 
financed in the first five years after the initial VC investment. We now analyse the 
determinants of the financing choices. The units of analysis are the external financing 
issues, expanding the sample for the analyses to 345 issues. Most independent 
variables are measured in the year of the financing issue. If the financing issue has an 
impact on the variable, it is measured in the year before the financing issue, namely 
the debt ratio, the bankruptcy ratio and firm size.  
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The data are first analysed using bivariate analyses. Since our data are not normally 
distributed, the Wilcoxon test is used to compare the characteristics of the ventures in 
our sample across different financing types. Second, financing choices are studied 
using multinomial logit analyses with three possible outcomes: debt, equity from 
existing shareholders only or equity from at least one new shareholder. Equity issues 
in which there are only new shareholders and equity issues where existing 
shareholders co-invest with new shareholders are combined in one group ‘at least one 
new shareholder’8. This group contains 28 observations, compared to 62 issues where 
existing shareholders only provide funding (see also Table 1 – Panel D). 
Some of the firms in our sample simultaneously raise bank debt and equity. 
This is the case for 108 of the 345 issues. In order to include as much information as 
possible, we treat simultaneous equity and bank debt issues as two separate issues in 
the bivariate analyses. This is not possible for the multivariate analyses, which require 
mutually exclusive dependent variables. Different procedures can be adopted to take 
into account a combination of equity and bank debt in a single year. Following 
Helwege and Liang (1996), we code multiple issues in one year as one particular type 
of financing. Firms that get equity financing are coded as issuing equity, irrespective 
of whether or not they also issue bank debt in the same year9. 
6.2 Independent variables 
Three variables are included to proxy information asymmetries and associated agency 
problems: tangible assets, intangible assets and the number of years since the initial 
VC participation. The banking literature stresses the role of collateral as a way for 
banks to reduce problems caused by asymmetric information with entrepreneurs 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). Tangible assets can serve as collateral. More tangible assets 
are thus associated with less information asymmetry problems. Intangible assets, on 
the other hand, consist mainly of R&D expenses, patents and licenses. It is difficult or 
not rewarding for traditional debt providers to ascertain the value of intangible assets, 
and their value may drop considerably in case of default. Therefore, bankers usually 
                                                           
8
 We acknowledge the fact that equity issues that involve a combination of new and existing 
shareholders on the one hand, and equity issues that involve only new investors may be different in 
nature. The small sample size prevents us to distinguish between both situations, however. 
9
 Results are robust, irrespective of how simultaneous equity and bank debt issues are treated. 
Excluding simultaneous debt and equity issues from the analyses or treating them as debt issues leads 
to similar results. 
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do not accept intangible assets as collateral. More intangible assets are therefore 
associated with more information asymmetry problems. tangible assets and intangible 
assets are measured respectively as the ratio of tangible assets and intangible assets to 
total assets. Bank debt is expected to be more used by firms with a higher proportion 
of tangibles and a lower proportion of intangibles. Finally, young firms do not have an 
established reputation or track record (Berger and Udell, 1998). We include # years 
since initial VC participation as a negative proxy for information asymmetries. This 
variable measures the time that has elapsed since the initial VC participation, which is 
expected to reduce information asymmetries.  
We include the variable bankruptcy risk as a proxy for financial risk. This 
variable is measured as a short-term bankruptcy indicator developed for Belgian 
companies, the Ooghe –Joos – De Vos score. It is a multivariate logit score for short-
term failure prediction developed in a Belgian context and therefore an appropriate 
alternative risk indicator for Altman’s Z score (Ooghe et al., 1995)10. The risk 
indicator varies between zero (financially healthy firm) and one (firm in financial 
distress). We also include three indicators of a firm’s debt capacity: the internally 
generated cash flow, the lagged debt ratio and the so-called notional debt ratio11. cash 
flow, measured as the ratio of the internally generated cash flow to total assets, is a 
negative proxy for the risk that firms default on their debt obligations (de Haan and 
Hinloopen, 2003) and hence, it is expected to be especially important in the decision 
between debt and equity. Cash rich, profitable firms have a higher debt capacity and 
are less likely to default compared to firms with low cash flows. The debt ratio gives 
an indication of how the firm has been financed in the past. It is a snapshot of a firm’s 
complete history of financing choices (de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003). A higher debt 
ratio presents lower protection of present or future debt providers, because of the 
smaller buffer of equity that debt providers can depend upon in case of liquidation. It 
is an indication that the firm has extensively used debt in the past, thereby reducing its 
additional debt capacity. To capture this effect, we include lagged debt ratio in our 
empirical model. This variable is measured as total debt, relative to total assets and 
                                                           
10
 The Ooghe-Joos-De Vos score is computed using 8 of the firm’s financial variables: (1) direction of 
financial leverage, (2) accumulated profits and reserves to total liabilities, (3) cash to total assets, (4) 
overdue  short-term priority debt, (5) operational net working capital to total assets, (6) net operating 
result to working assets, (7)  short-term financial debt to  short-term liabilities and (8) amounts payable 
guaranteed by public authorities and real securities to total amounts payable 
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lagged one year, to account for the fact that the financing decision alters the debt ratio. 
Following Mayer and Sussman (2005), we further compute a hypothetical debt ratio, 
the notional debt ratio. This measure indicates what the firm’s leverage would have 
been in case the firm would not have issued equity, but debt instead. The notional debt 
ratio is measured as follows: if debt is issued, then the notional debt ratio equals the 
debt ratio; if equity is issued, then the equity issue is added to the debt to compute the 
hypothetical debt ratio. So, the notional debt ratio allows to examine whether equity is 
issued when debt financing would force firms to excessively high debt levels. 
6.3 Control variables 
Control variables are included to deal with effects that may impact the 
dependent variables, but that are not taken into account yet. Issue size may affect a 
firm’s choice between different types of funding. Firms with few investment 
opportunities that require only a limited amount of external funding are expected to 
issue debt financing, in order to avoid the relatively high due diligence and 
contracting costs associated with equity issues. Issue size may also affect the choice 
between equity from existing and new shareholders. For example, existing 
shareholders may not be willing to concentrate too much of their financial resources 
in one firm, but instead diversify their investments, thereby reducing the overall risk 
of their portfolio (Manigart et al., 2005). Moreover, financial resources of existing 
shareholders may be insufficient to finance the entrepreneurial firm’s growth 
aspirations. Therefore, attracting new investors may well be the only way to cover 
large financing needs. Two measures of issue size are included in the analyses. 
relative issue size is computed as the ratio of issue size to pre-issue total assets. 
absolute issue size is measured as the log of issue size (in €). 
Market conditions may affect a firm’s choice between debt and equity. 
Previous studies have used firm level measures such as price earnings ratio (Panno, 
2003) or stock price run-up (de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003) and aggregate equity 
market level measures (Bayless and Diltz, 1994) to control for public equity market 
conditions.  
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 Unreported results show that our results do not change significantly when using alternative measures 
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As the firms in our sample are unquoted, firm level market data are not 
available. Since it is expected that private equity markets follow the evolution of 
public equity markets, we include yearly price/earnings for the Belgian market in our 
analyses (Source: Thompson Financial Datastream) to control for general conditions 
in the equity markets. Following Bayless and Diltz (1994), we also include a measure 
for the level of interest. ltinterest, measured per year, is the 10-year benchmark 
Belgian government bond yield (Source: OECD). It is expected that increasing 
price/earnings and interest rates lead firms to prefer equity rather than debt financing. 
Higher price earnings ratios make equity cheaper and thus more attractive to 
entrepreneurs. 
Firms within a certain industry often have similar capital structures. To control 
for industry effects, industry dummies, based on 1-digit Nace codes, are included in 
our analyses (but not reported in the Tables). Finally, in order to capture potential 
effects of the initial VC investor, firms are split in 3 groups according to their initial 
VC backer: firms financed by independent, by captive or by government related VC 
companies. For example, ventures which are initially financed by bank-related VC 
firms may find it easier to get additional debt from that bank afterwards (Hellmann et 
al., 2004). Two dummy variables, independent and captive, are included in the 
analyses. Of the 191 firms, a majority (151 firms) is backed by a government related 
VC company, the remainder by independent (13 firms) or captive VC companies (27 
firms). 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of the continuous 
independent variables. As shown in Table 3, correlations between independent 
variables may cause collinearity problems in multivariate analyses. The notional debt 
ratio is highly correlated with cash flow (-0.65), bankruptcy risk (0.51) and the lagged 
debt ratio (0.64). Therefore, we specify two multivariate regression models. In the 
first model, we include three proxies for risk: the bankruptcy risk indicator, cash flow 
- as a negative proxy for the default risk - and lagged debt ratio. We specify a second 
model in which only the notional debt ratio is included as indicator of limited debt 
                                                                                                                                                                          
for debt capacity, such as interest coverage and cash flow coverage of debt. 
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capacity. Table 3 further shows that lagged firm size and absolute issue size are highly 
correlated (0.86), indicating that larger firms typically raise larger amounts of external 
funding. Absolute issue size, rather than firm size, is included in the reported 
multivariate logit models12. The effect of market conditions of equity and debt 
markets are hard to disentangle, since the price/earnings variable is highly negatively 
correlated with the long-term interest rate variable (-0.65), indicating that periods with 
a high price earnings ratio, in which more equity issues are expected, are also periods 
which are characterised by low long-term interest rates, in which more debt issues are 
expected. Price/earnings are included in the reported multivariate logit models13. 
7 RESULTS 
7.1 Bivariate analyses 
Table 4 shows the characteristics of firms issuing debt (D firms), of firms 
issuing equity to existing VC shareholders only (E-E firms) and of firms issuing 
equity to at least one new investor (E-N firms). The results indicate that the 
characteristics of D, E-E and E-N firms exhibit a certain order, but the differences are 
not always statistically significant13. 
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
The median ratio of tangible assets to total assets is 25% for D firms, 21% for 
E-E firms and 16% for E-N firms (not significantly different). D firms have 
significantly lower levels of intangible assets than E-E firms and E-N firms, which 
have the highest levels of intangible assets. D firms have a median intangible assets 
ratio of zero, compared to 2% for firms that issue equity. This finding is consistent 
with hypotheses 1 and 2b. The results also indicate that firms typically get equity from 
new shareholders sooner after the initial VC participation, compared to equity from 
existing shareholders (significant at 5% level) and get equity from existing 
shareholders sooner relative to D (marginally significant at 10% level). 
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 Results are robust, irrespective of which variable is included in the analyses. 
13
 The statistical insignificance of some of the results may be due to the small sample size, especially of 
E-N firms. 
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Consistent with hypotheses 3a and 4, our results show that D firms have the 
lowest level of bankruptcy risk, while E-N firms have the highest levels of bankruptcy 
risk. E-E firms have intermediate levels of bankruptcy risk. This difference is 
statistically significant. 
Overall, the results for cash flow, debt ratio and notional debt ratio suggest 
that firms tend to issue equity when their additional debt capacity is low, confirming 
hypothesis 3b. The internally generated cash flows of the young, growth-oriented 
firms in our sample are low. About 37% of the firms that get new financing have 
negative cash flows. About half of the firms that issue equity have negative cash 
flows, compared to only 30% of the firms that issue debt. Cash flows of D firms are 
significantly larger (significant at 1% level), compared to firms that issue equity. The 
median ratio of cash flows to total assets for E-N firms is even negative. 
The median debt ratio equals about 71% for D firms and E-E firms, with 80% 
debt for E-N firms. The difference between D firms and E-N firms is marginally 
significant at the 10% level. Notional debt ratios are significantly different between 
the three groups. The median notional debt ratio for firms that issue VC is 88%. For 
E-N firms, the notional debt ratio is even higher: if the latter would have obtained 
bank debt instead of equity, their median debt ratio would have gone up to 97%. 
Finally, the control variables indicate that both relative and absolute issue 
sizes are significantly larger for firms that issue equity. A median debt issue equals 
20% of firm assets or € 373 353. E-E firms issue 25% of their assets or € 495 787, 
while E-N firms issue 26% of their assets or € 793 258 (median values). The firm size 
also shows the same order: pre-issue total assets are smallest for D firms (€ 1 829 
380), followed by E-E firms (€ 2 045 122), and finally E-N firms (€ 2 805 000). 
However, the difference is not statistically significant. No significant differences exist 
with respect to price/earnings and long-term interest rate. 
7.2 Multivariate logit analyses 
Table 5 presents the results of multinomial logit analyses on the choice 
between the three financing sources: bank debt, equity from existing shareholders 
only and equity from at least one new investor. Multinomial logit analyses are used 
rather than a two-step logit model, where the first step would model the choice 
between debt and equity and the second step would model the choice between new 
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investors and existing investors for equity issuing companies. For our analyses, 
multinomial logit analyses are preferred since unreported results indicate that the 
Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives (IAA) condition, a key assumption of 
multinomial logit, is satisfied. This suggests that the choice between debt, equity from 
existing shareholders only and equity from at least one new investor is a one-step 
choice rather than a two-step choice. Three models are presented: the base model 
including only the control variables (model 0) and the two models previously 
discussed.14 Models (1) and (2) are statistically significant at the 1% level. The results 
of the bivariate statistics are confirmed by the multivariate logit analyses15. We first 
present the coefficients of the control variables and thereafter we discuss the 
coefficients related to the hypotheses. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
The results of the base model (model 0) show that firms tend to use equity 
instead of debt when the relative issue size is large, especially when equity is raised 
from new investors (significant at the 1% level). Moreover, firms with large financing 
needs relative to their size are more likely to get equity from new investors rather than 
from existing investors (marginally significant at the 10% level). Absolute issue size 
does not affect the choice between equity from existing and equity from new 
shareholders, however. The coefficient of price/earnings in models 1 and 2 indicates 
that firms tend to finance with debt, followed by equity from existing shareholders 
and finally by equity from new shareholders when price/earnings are high. Because 
price/earnings are negatively correlated to long-term interest rates, this result suggests 
that low interest rates lead firms to opt for debt, rather than equity. Firms initially 
backed by captive VC firms get more debt or equity from new shareholders, 
compared to firms initially funded by government backed VC firms. This is consistent 
with earlier findings that bank related VC backed companies more easily raise money 
from banks (Hellmann et al., 2004), but bank related VC firms tend to be less 
involved in follow-on equity financing rounds. 
                                                           
14
 The multinomial logit specification takes into account that some observations are not independent, as 
one company may experience multiple financing events.   
15
 Although the coefficients are not always statistically significant, which may be due to the small 
sample size, they always have the expected sign. 
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The variables that capture the effect of information asymmetries and the way 
in which different financiers deal with asymmetric information and associated agency 
problems are significantly related to a venture’s choice between the three types of 
funding sources. Hypothesis 1 states that firms with high levels of information 
asymmetries will issue equity rather than debt. The results provide strong support for 
hypothesis 1. Firms with a lower proportion of tangible assets and a higher proportion 
of intangible assets raise equity rather than debt. Firms with a lot of tangible assets 
especially use debt rather than equity from existing shareholders (models 1 and 2, 
significant at 5% level) and to a lesser extent use debt rather than equity from new 
shareholders (model 1, marginally significant at 10%). This is strong evidence for the 
role of collateral in the provision of debt financing. The opposite relation is true for 
firms with a lot of intangible assets, as the results suggest that these firms have a low 
probability of raising debt. Having more intangible assets increases the probability of 
raising equity from existing shareholders (model 1,marginally significant at 10% level 
and model 2, significant at 5% level) or from new shareholders (models 1 and 2, 
significant at 1% level). Further, firms that get equity, both from existing and from 
new shareholders, do so sooner after the initial equity participation, compared to debt 
financing 16 (significant at the 10% for existing shareholders and at the 1% and 5% 
level for new shareholders). Consistent with hypothesis 2b and in contrast with 
hypothesis 2a, firms with the highest levels of information asymmetries are likely to 
involve new shareholders, rather than restrict themselves to existing shareholders 
only. The results for tangible assets point in the hypothesized direction, but are not 
significant. This may indicate that tangible assets and hence collateral value are 
especially important in the choice between debt and equity, but less so in the choice 
between equity from existing and new shareholders. New shareholders rather than 
existing shareholders are sought by firms with important intangible assets (model 1, 
significant at 10% level and model 2, significant at 5% level). Finally, new 
shareholders are especially important in financing young firms in a short time period 
after the initial VC investment (model 1, significant at 10% level and model 2, 
significant at 5% level). 
                                                           
16
 This result also suggests that firms are younger when applying for equity, compared to debt. 
However, one should keep in mind that even the oldest firms in this study are still relatively young 
compared to the firms that are typically examined in studies on mature firms. Therefore, even the 
‘older’ firms in our sample may still be confronted with important information asymmetries. 
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Bankruptcy risk also affects ventures’ financing choices. Consistent with 
hypothesis 3a, firms with higher bankruptcy risk typically issue equity from new 
shareholders rather than debt (model 1, significant at 5% level). Consistent with 
hypothesis 4, firms with high bankruptcy risk tend to involve new shareholders, 
instead of existing shareholders only. The choice between debt and VC is further 
affected by considerations of limited additional debt capacity. Model 1 shows that 
there is a significant positive relation (1% significance level) between internally 
generated cash flows and the use of debt. This indicates that firms with relatively high 
cash flows are able to raise debt, whereas firms with low cash flows are financed by 
equity. The lagged debt ratio is positively related to the use of equity, but this 
coefficient is never statistically significant. The coefficient of the notional debt ratio, 
however, (model 2) is highly significant (1% level) in the choice of firms between 
debt and equity. This indicates that considerations of limited debt capacity are 
important in the follow-on financing decision of VC backed start-ups between debt 
and equity, consistent with hypothesis 3b. 
8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The new financing issues of a sample of 191 venture capital backed start-ups 
are studied and the determinants of the choice between bank debt and equity from 
existing or new investors are sought. Consistent with staging arguments (Gompers, 
1995), we show that the initial VC investment does not fully cover the further external 
financing needs of the VC backed start-ups in our sample. 75% of the firms get 
additional external funding over a five year period after the first VC investment, often 
on more than one occasion. 40% percent of the firms in our sample get additional 
equity funding. Staging of capital allows VC firms to cut their losses, if portfolio 
companies do not perform as expected. Moreover, it allows ventures to reconsider 
which type of financing they want to use when they develop and conditions change.  
Surprisingly and in contrast with the entrepreneurial finance literature that 
almost exclusively stresses the role of equity in funding young, high growth-oriented 
companies, the financing strategy of the VC backed start-ups in our sample includes 
more debt than equity. About half of the ventures in our sample rely on debt only, 
while most of the other firms use a combination of bank debt and equity to finance 
further growth. The total amount raised from banks is considerably larger than the 
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external equity raised, showing that banks are important and cannot be ignored in 
financing young, growth-oriented companies. The evidence strongly suggests that the 
initial VC investment is sufficient to become bankworthy for some of the VC backed 
start-ups in our sample. The presence of a VC firm may have facilitated the firms’ 
access to debt financing, suggesting a certification role of VC firms. The fact that the 
initial VC investment increased the equity of their portfolio companies of course also 
make them more bankworthy. Equity issues are, however, substantially larger than 
debt issues, indicating that equity is important if the venture requires large amounts of 
money. Firms that obtain additional equity funding are often financed by the VC firms 
that invested at the start, as we show that new shareholders (co-)invest in only one 
third of the equity issues. 
We examine the determinants of the choice of young, VC backed ventures 
between bank debt and equity from new or existing shareholders. Low collateral 
value, high risk and large projects all drive the entrepreneurs to finance their firm with 
equity, rather than with bank debt and vice versa. Further, ventures rely more on 
equity investors when information asymmetries are high. Firms use equity to finance 
intangible assets and activities with little collateral, while firms with more tangible 
assets are typically financed with bank debt. These results confirm the findings of 
Gompers (1995) that equity staging is more important as the expected agency costs 
increase. The findings also highlight how investors deal with asymmetric information 
and the agency problems associated with it and the merits that specialised financial 
intermediaries, such as VC investors, have in dealing with large information 
asymmetries. While financial intermediaries such as banks are able to assess the value 
of tangible assets, VC investors, as highly specialised and well-informed investors 
(Ueda, 2004), are better suited for assessing the value of intangible assets and growth 
opportunities. Our results are consistent with the extended pecking order theory, and 
more specifically with the idea developed by Lemmon and Zender (2004). It is not 
because a large proportion of growth-oriented entrepreneurial companies do not rely 
on debt, that this invalidates the pecking order theory. We showed that companies that 
have excess debt capacity do issue bank debt, but equity is raised by companies that 
could not access bank debt given their information asymmetries, high risk, high 
growth options and low collateral. This goes against the traditional interpretation of 
the pecking order theory (e.g. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)). 
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We further show that information asymmetries are important in understanding 
the choice between new and existing shareholders. Firms get equity from new instead 
of existing shareholders when information asymmetries are larger. This suggests that 
the choice between existing and new shareholders is not driven by attempts of 
entrepreneurs to minimize costs of information production or to avoid the disclosure 
of sensitive information. Instead, new investors are sought when specialised skills, 
necessary to screen and monitor growth options, are important. This is in line with 
previous research on the motives for VC syndication (Brander et al., 2002). This may 
also point to the fact that entrepreneurs may wish to decrease the negotiation power of 
the initial VC investors by inviting new investors (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994). We 
showed that this is especially important when the value of the venture is highly 
uncertain due to high information asymmetries.  
Our results further highlight another important role of VC in financing young, 
growth-oriented ventures. Consistent with the findings of Mayer and Sussman (2005), 
early stage firms with important growth aspirations rely on equity financing when the 
use of debt would push them to excessively high debt levels. Equity investors act as 
financiers of last resort in that firms only issue equity in case debt capacity is 
exhausted. Our results with respect to risk also provide insights in why certain firms 
are financed by existing shareholders while others look for new investors. We show 
that new investors are especially prevalent in high-risk firms. Existing VC 
shareholders may wish to diversify their risks and invite other players to the 
syndicate, so as to share the risk. The results also hint that there may exist adverse 
selection problems between new and existing shareholders in that existing 
shareholders invite new investors especially in low quality and high-risk firms 
(Meuleman et al., 2005; Brander et al., 2002). 
The sample used for this study has a number of important advantages. First, 
contrary to most studies on young ventures that use a random sample of SMEs, our 
sample allows us to test a set of financing choices that is not truncated to the use of 
internal funds and debt financing only (Howorth, 2001). As the firms in our sample 
have received VC, they have proven that they are willing to open their shareholder 
base and share control over the venture. We emphasize that our sample is not a 
random sample of young ventures as all companies in the present study were 
successful in attracting VC at a very young age. The empirical evidence on the 
financing needs, the availability, role and importance of equity and debt funding for 
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young ventures may therefore not be generalizable to firms with lower growth 
potential or lower growth orientation. Moreover, receiving venture capital at start-up 
may have affected the availability of further financing from other parties. 
Entrepreneurs that previously have acquired external financing have been found more 
likely to do so again (de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003; Helwege and Liang, 1996). This 
may be attributed to learning effects: the experience of getting external financing may 
enhance the ability of entrepreneurs to negotiate with investors (Van Auken, 2001; 
Wright et al., 1997). Further, next to financial resources, VC firms certify their 
portfolio companies and provide them with credibility and legitimacy. Moreover, 
because VC firms reduce information asymmetries through screening and monitoring, 
VC backed start-ups may be more attractive to other investors. Other parties may 
therefore free-ride on the efforts that the VC has exerted. Finally, the availability of 
different financing sources may also be affected by other factors than those 
considered in this study. For example, we have no information on the technological or 
business progress of the firms since the last cash injection, which may nonetheless be 
an important determinant for the availability of subsequent equity funding by the 
same or a new investor. 
The results of this study are important for entrepreneurs. Our findings suggest 
that about 60% of the firms do not get further equity funding, in contrast to the 
emphasis in the literature on the importance and widespread use of staged equity 
financing by the VC firm. Hence, further dilution and loss of control should not be a 
major concern for the average VC backed entrepreneurial company. After having 
received VC, bank debt is by far the most important financing source. However, 
further equity rounds are important for firms with large information asymmetries, 
high risk of default and bankruptcy, and with large financing needs. Those firms 
should expect follow-on equity investments and hence, take into account further 
dilution.  
The results of this study are important for VC investors. Our study suggests 
that VC investors may act as financiers of last resort in that firms especially rely on 
equity when other, cheaper sources of funding are unavailable. This has important 
implications for VC investors. Effective selection by VC investors should result in the 
funding of the most promising projects. However, our results suggest that VC 
investors face an important adverse selection problem. Indeed, as argued by Amit, 
Muller and Glosten (1990), our results suggest that equity investors who join in 
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follow-on equity financing rounds may only be invited into projects with high levels 
of financial and agency risks. Their role is then to decrease information asymmetries 
and to mitigate the risk of the initial VC investors. These findings confirm the 
important role that equity investors have as producers of information.  Bringing in 
new investors may also strengthen the negotiation position of the entrepreneurs by 
decreasing the negotiation power of the initial VC investors and thereby reducing the 
reverse agency and hold-up problem. This is again especially important in ventures 
with high information asymmetries.  This outcome may, however, be less attractive 
from the point of view of the new syndicate partners, as they know that they may face 
adverse selection problems.  
On the other hand, it may well be that the higher risk profile of the ventures 
may significantly reduce the value of the venture at investment and thereby yield high 
upside potential. Comparing the type of investors with the value at investment may 
yield a fruitful avenue for future research. Distinguishing between equity rounds 
involving solely new investors on the one hand and those involving both existing and 
new investors may also increase our understanding of the financing process in these 
types of ventures. 
The results of this study are important for policy makers. Getting sufficient 
and adequate funding is often considered to be especially difficult for young, 
entrepreneurial ventures and may put significant constraints on the growth of these 
firms (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002b). Therefore, governments all over the world 
have set up programs to enhance the availability of financing for this type of 
companies. This study has shown that equity – especially from specialized VC 
investors - plays a crucial role in the growth of young, high potential firms. Equity is 
used especially by firms faced with large information asymmetries, which may have 
difficulties in accessing more traditional sources of funding. Moreover, equity issues 
are especially important when debt issues would push firms beyond their debt 
capacity. Hence, VC alleviates constraints on firm growth and allows firms to grow 
beyond what would have been possible using only internal funding or debt. This is an 
important reason for governments to further stimulate the availability of VC financing 
for entrepreneurial ventures. It might be worthwhile to understand whether business 
angels, who also provide equity funding to young, entrepreneurial companies, play 
similar roles, as European governments also tend to subsidize business angel 
networks. 
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However, although VC and, more generally, equity may be crucial for the 
growth of some entrepreneurial ventures, we have shown that bank debt is even more 
important for these growth-oriented ventures. There are major concerns about how the 
availability of credit to small ventures is affected by waves of consolidation in the 
banking industry. Moreover, so far little is known on, for example, the effect of the 
Basel II regulation on the availability of bank financing for young, high potential 
ventures. Careful monitoring by the public authorities of the availability of bank debt 
to SMEs is therefore important. 
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TABLE 1 
Description of the sample 
Panel A: VC backed start-ups in sample by year of VC participation 
Year # of VC backed start-ups in 
sample 
# of seed & start-ups 
reported by EVCA(a) 
VC backed start-ups in our 
sample as % of seed & start-
ups receiving VC 
1987 30 NA - 
1988 19 31   61% 
1989 16 41   39% 
1990 22 33   67% 
1991 16 42   38% 
1992   9 47   19% 
1993 11 39   28% 
1994 11 30   37% 
1995 19 18 100% 
1996 24 51   47% 
1997 14 73   19% 
Total (excl. 1987) 191 (161) 405   40% 
NA - not available 
VC - venture capital 
(a)
 Source: European Venture Capital Association (EVCA), 1987 – 1997 
 
Panel B: Distribution of sample firms by industry  
Industry (1 digit NACE code) % of VC 
backed start-
ups  
# of VC backed 
start-ups  
0: Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing   0%     0 
1: Energy and water   1%     1 
2: Extraction and processing of non-energy-producing minerals and 
derived products; chemical industry 
  8%   16 
3: Metal manufacture; mechanical and instrument engineering 20%   39 
4: Other manufacturing industries 11%   21 
5: Building and civil engineering   4%     8 
6: Distributive trades, hotels, catering, repairs 17%   32 
7: Transport and communication   5%     9 
8: Banking and finance, insurance, business services, renting 25%   47 
9: Other services   9%   18 
Total 100% 191 
This table reports the distribution of the initial VC backed sample. 
Panel A represents the number of VC backed start-ups in the initial sample, relative to the total number 
of seed and start-ups firms receiving venture capital. Using secondary data, VC backed start-ups are 
identified as firms which get VC between 1987 and 1997 and which are at most 2 years old at the time 
of VC participation. This number of VC backed start-ups companies is compared to total number of 
companies receiving VC financing for seed or start-up purposes, as defined and reported by the 
European Venture Capital Association (EVCA): “Seed financing is financing provided to research, 
assess and develop an initial concept before a business has reached start-up phase. Start-up financing is 
financing provided for product development and initial marketing. Start-up firms may be in process of 
being set up or may have been in business for a short time, but have not sold their product 
commercially.” 
 
 45 
TABLE 2 
Financing history of VC backed start-ups within first 5 years after initial VC 
participation 
Panel A: Type of issues and firms issuing equity and/or bank debt by year after initial VC participation 
Issue year Equity 
(#) 
Bank 
debt 
(#) 
Total 
(#) 
# of firms 
with new 
issue 
# of firms in 
sample 
% of firms in 
sample with new 
issue 
Year 1      28     45    73 55 191 29% 
Year 2      38     74  112 91 180 51% 
Year 3      21     46    67 59 166 36% 
Year 4     16     43    59 54 150 36% 
Year 5     12     22    34 32 136 24% 
Total    115   230  345    
 
Panel B: Median and total amounts of equity and bank debt issues by year after initial VC participation 
Issue year Equity: 
Median amount 
(€ th) 
Equity: 
Total amount 
(€ th) 
Bank debt: 
Median amount 
(€ th) 
Bank debt: 
Total amount 
(€ th) 
Total 
(€ th) 
Year 1 507 110 679 487 391 710   502 389 
Year 2 648 187 013 448 186 553   373 571 
Year 3 847   49 158 397 139 065   188 223 
Year 4 337   33 142 216   53 698     86 841 
Year 5 743   38 725 236   18 677     57 403 
Total  496 418 724 373 789 705 1 208 429 
 
Panel C: Distribution of equity issues by type of investor 
Type of equity investor # of equity issues % of equity 
issues 
% of equity issues 
where investor is 
known 
Type of investor: known, of which   90   78%  
- Existing shareholders only   62   54%   69% 
- New shareholders only   13   11%   14% 
- Both existing and new shareholders   15   13%   17% 
Type of investor: unknown   25   22% - 
Total issues 115 100% 100% 
 
Panel D: Number of equity and/or bank debt issues per firm 
Number of issues per 
firm 
# of firms % of issuing firms % of all firms 
(issuing and non-issuing) 
No issues   48 -   25% 
At least one issue: 143    75% 
   1   41   29%   22% 
   2   45   31%   23% 
   3   32   22%   17% 
   4   11     8%     6% 
   5 or more(1)   14   10%     7% 
Total 191 100% 100% 
(1)
 Firms can issue both bank debt and equity in one year. 
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Panel E: Distribution of issues and firms by type of firm 
Type of firm # of issues % of 
issues 
# of firms % of issuing 
firms 
% of all firms 
(issuing and non 
issuing) 
No issues     0     0%   48 -   25% 
Equity only issuer   13     4%   11     8%     7% 
Debt only issuer 108   31%   66   46%   34% 
Equity and debt issuer 224   65%   66   46%   34% 
Total 345 100% 191 100% 100% 
This table reports the financing history of 191 VC backed start-ups. VC backed start-ups are identified 
as firms which get VC between 1987 and 1997 and which are at most 2 years old at the time of VC 
participation. Using financial accounts data, information on new external equity and bank debt issues, 
following the initial VC participation, is gathered. An equity/bank debt issue is defined as an increase 
of current equity/bank debt of at least 5%, relative to beginning-of-year total assets. Reported bank debt 
and equity issues take place during the first 5 years after initial VC participation (period: 1988 – 2002). 
Combining all debt and equity issues of the 191 ventures in our sample yields 345 financing events. 
Panel A reports the distribution by type of issue and by issue year of 345 issues made by the VC 
backed start-ups in our sample. Issue year indicates the year relative to the year of the initial VC 
participation. This panel also reports the distribution by issue year of firms with a new equity and/or 
bank debt issue. 
Panel B reports the median and total amounts of equity and debt issues by issuing firms by year after 
initial VC participation (in € th) 
Panel C represents the distribution by type of investor of the 115 equity issues made by the VC backed 
start-ups in our sample. For the equity issues, we identify, as far as possible, the investors using hand-
collected data. For 90 equity issues, the investors are known, while there are unknown for the 
remaining 25 equity issues. These equity issues are then divided in issues in which (a) only existing 
shareholders invest, (b) only new shareholders invest and (c) issues in which both existing and new 
shareholders invest.  
Panel D represents the number of issues per firm during the first 5 year after initial VC funding. 
Panel E illustrates the type of funding of the 345 financing events of 143 VC backed start-ups (48 firms 
of the initial 191 VC backed start-ups do not get additional equity or bank debt). An equity only/ debt 
only issuer is a firm that issue only new equity/new bank debt during the first 5 years after the initial 
equity participation. A debt and equity issuer is a firm that issues both new equity and bank debt during 
the first 5 years after initial VC participation. 
 
 
 
.
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TABLE 3 
Correlation matrix of independent variables (N=345) 
 
Correlation Tangible 
assets 
Intangible 
assets 
# Years since 
initial VC 
participation 
Cash 
flow 
(Bankruptcy 
risk)
 t-1 
(Debt 
ratio)
 t-1 
Notional 
debt 
ratio 
Relative 
issue 
size 
Absolute 
issue 
size 
(Firm 
size)
 t-1 
Price / 
Earnings 
Tangible assets  1.00           
Intangible assets -0.22  1.00          
# Years since initial VC 
participation 
-0.14 -0.06  1.00         
Cash flow  0.00 -0.22 -0.03  1.00        
(Bankruptcy risk)
 t-1  0.15  0.34 -0.04 -0.34  1.00       
(Debt ratio)
 t-1  0.00  0.08  0.06 -0.05  0.36  1.00      
Notional debt ratio -0.03  0.30  0.11 -0.65  0.51  0.64  1.00     
Relative issue size  0.09  0.07 -0.04 -0.28  0.25  0.03  0.33  1.00    
Log(Absolute issue size)  0.14 -0.02 -0.09 -0.05 -0.05 -0.24 -0.13  0.24  1.00   
Log(Firm size)
 t-1  0.10 -0.08  0.02  0.10 -0.19 -0.28 -0.33 -0.20  0.86  1.00  
Price/Earnings -0.01  0.15 -0.01 -0.26  0.19  0.05  0.18  0.09 -0.03 -0.08  1.00 
LT interest  0.01 -0.19 -0.21  0.18 -0.15 -0.10 -0.18 -0.04  0.07  0.10 -0.65 
 
This table presents the correlation coefficients across the independent variables. Correlations are based on 345 issues made by 191 VC backed start-ups within 
the first 5 years after VC participation, as summarized in Table 2, Panel C. Tangible and intangible assets is the ratio of respectively tangible and intangible 
assets to total assets. Cash flow is the ratio of internally generated cash flows relative to total assets. Bankruptcy risk is a short-term risk indicator developed for 
Belgian firms, ranging from zero for financially healthy firms to 1 for firms in financial distress. Debt ratio is measured as total debt, relative to total assets. 
Notional debt ratio is calculated as follows: if debt is issued, then the notional debt ratio equals the debt ratio; if equity is issued, then the new equity issue is 
added to the existing debt to calculate the notional debt ratio. Relative issue size is the ratio of issue size to pre-issue total assets. Absolute issue size is the 
absolute amount of the issue (in € th). Firm size is measured as total assets (in € th). Price/Earnings measured per year, stands for the price/earnings for the 
Belgian market. LTinterest measured per year is the 10-year benchmark Belgian government bond yield. 
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TABLE 4 
Firm characteristics by issue type 
VARIABLE Debt Equity Equity from 
existing 
shareholders 
Equity from at 
least one new 
shareholder 
Debt – 
Equity 
Debt – Equity 
from existing 
shareholders 
Debt – Equity 
from at least 
one new 
shareholder 
Equity from 
existing 
shareholders – 
Equity from at 
least one new 
shareholder 
 Median St.Dev. Median St.Dev. Median St.Dev. Median St.Dev. Sign.(1) Sign.(1) Sign.(1) Sign.(1) 
Information 
asymmetries 
            
Tangible assets 0.25 0.25 0.19 0.27 0.21 0.28 0.16 0.26     
Intangible assets 0.00 0.13 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.21 *** ** *** * 
# Years since initial 
VC participation 
2.00 1.25 2.00 1.28 2.00 1.33 2.00 1.14       **(2)    *(3) 
 Bankruptcy Risk            
(Bankruptcy  risk)
 t-1 0.54 0.32 0.73 0.33 0.64 0.36 0.87 0.28 *** * *** ** 
Debt capacity 
Cash flow 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.29 0.01 0.30 -0.01 0.28 *** *** ***  
(Debt ratio)
 t-1 0.71 0.26 0.72 0.30 0.71 0.31 0.80 0.27   *  
Notional debt ratio 0.79 0.32 0.88 0.37 0.86 0.39 0.97 0.37 *** ** *** * 
Control variables             
Relative issue size 0.20 0.54 0.25 0.66 0.25 0.60 0.26 0.80 *** ** **  
Log(Absolute issue 
size) 
12.79 1.85 13.11 1.89 13.11 1.87 13.59 1.78 ** * **  
Log(Firm size)
 t-1 14.42 1.70 14.61 1.84 14.53 1.73 14.85 1.99     
Price/Earnings 13.95 4.00 13.40 4.00 13.40 3.57 13.40 3.35     
LT interest 7.40 1.83 7.20 1.84 7.70 7.25 8.00 1.91     
Number of issues 230  115  62  28      
This table reports the issue and firm characteristics of 345 issues made by 143 VC backed start-ups. VC backed start-ups are identified as firms which get VC 
between 1987 and 1997 and which are at most 2 years old at the time of VC participation. Using yearly financial accounts data, information on new equity and 
bank debt issues, following the initial VC participation, is gathered. An equity/bank debt issue is defined as an increase of current equity/bank debt of at least 5%, 
relative to beginning-of-year total assets. Reported bank debt and equity issues take place during the first 5 years after initial VC participation (period: 1988 – 
2002). The initial sample of firms consists of 191 VC backed start-ups, of which 48 do not issue new equity or debt within the first 5 years after initial VC 
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participation (see also Table 2 – Panel A). For the 115 equity issues, we identify, as far as possible, the investors using hand-collected data. For 90 equity issues, 
the investors are known. These equity issues are divided in (a) 62 issues in which only existing shareholders invest and (b) 28 issues in which at least one new 
shareholder invests. Category (b) is a combination of 13 issues in which only new shareholders invest and 15 issues in which both existing and new shareholders 
invest (see also Table 2 – Panel D). For the remaining 25 equity issues, the investor(s) are unknown. Within 1 year firms can issue both equity and bank debt. In 
this case, the firm characteristics of both issues are the same, whereas the issue characteristics differ. Within each issue category, we report median values and 
standard deviations for several characteristics that are expected to affect the issue choice. Also reported are the results from a Wilcoxon – Mann - Whitney test 
across between different categories. Tangible and intangible assets are the ratio of respectively tangible and intangible assets to total assets. Cash flow is the ratio 
of internally generated cash flows relative to total assets. Bankruptcy risk is a short-term risk indicator developed for Belgian firms, ranging from zero for 
financially healthy firms to 1 for firms in financial distress. Debt ratio is measured as total debt, relative to total assets. Notional debt ratio is calculated as 
follows: if debt is issued, then the notional debt ratio equals the debt ratio; if equity is issued, then the new equity issue is added to the existing debt to calculate 
the notional debt ratio. Relative issue size is the ratio of issue size to pre-issue total assets. Absolute issue size is the absolute amount of the issue (in € th). Firm 
size is measured as total assets (in € th). Price/Earnings measured per year, stands for the price/earnings for the Belgian market. LT interest measured per year is 
the 10-year benchmark Belgian government bond yield. 
 
(1)
  Sign.: Results of Wilcoxon – Mann - Whitney test: Significance level (1-sided): * 0.05 ≤ p < 0.10; ** 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05;*** p <0.01; 
(2)
  Debt > At least one new shareholder 
(3)
  Existing shareholders > At least one new shareholder 
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TABLE 5 
Determinants of the choice between equity from existing investors only, equity from at least one new investor and bank debt 
(Multinomial logit regression results – N=275) 
Regression Equity from existing shareholders 
versus debt 
Equity from at least one new shareholders 
versus debt 
Equity from at least one new shareholder 
versus equity from existing shareholders 
Model (0) (1) (2) (0) (1) (2) (0) (1) (2) 
 Coeff. Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff. Sign. Coeff. Sign. 
Intercept -2.48  -1.61  -3.73 ** -2.18  -1.96   -2.87   0.31  -0.34   0.86  
Information asymmetries 
Tangible assets   -1.21 ** -1.15 **   -1.91 * -1.35    -0.69  -0.21  
Intangible assets    1.83 *  1.97 **    3.82 ***  4.59 ***    1.99 *  2.61 ** 
# Years since 
initial VC 
participation 
  -0.18 * -0.19 *   -0.53 ** -0.60 ***   -0.35 * -0.40 ** 
Risk and debt capacity 
- Risk 
(Bankruptcy risk)
 t-
1 
   0.06       2.01 **      1.96 **   
- Debt capacity 
Cash flow   -2.72 ***     -2.77 ***     -0.06    
(Debt ratio)
 t-1    0.24       0.54       0.30    
Notional debt ratio      1.58 ***      2.35 ***      0.77  
Control variables 
Relative issue size  0.69 *  0.48   0.32   1.28 ***  0.91 ***  0.92 ***  0.59 *  0.43   0.60 * 
Log(Absolute 
issue size) 
 0.04   0.17 *  0.23 **  0.08   0.24 **  0.24 *** -0.04   0.07   0.01  
Price/Earnings -0.015  -0.07 ** -0.05  -0.09 * -0.24 *** -0.22 *** -0.08  -0.17 ** -0.16 ** 
Independent VC  0.34  -0.18  -0.27   0.37  -1.12  -1.13   0.03  -0.94  -0.86  
Captive VC -1.03 * -1.11 ** -1.08 **  0.42   0.27   0.35   1.46 **  1.38 *  1.44 ** 
Log Likelihood -
212.47 
 -
189.80 
 -
192.97 
            
Chi-squared  26.36 0.154    
86.68 
0.000    
86.00 
0.000             
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This table presents logit estimates of the determinants of the financing choices of 143 VC backed start-ups within the first 5 years after initial VC participation 
(period: 1988 - 2002). Panel A reports the logit results for the choice between equity and bank debt. Panel B reports the multinomial logit results for the choice 
between equity from existing shareholders, equity from at least one new shareholder and bank debt. An equity/bank debt issue is defined as an increase of current 
equity/bank debt of at least 5%, relative to beginning-of-year total assets. If a firm issues both equity and bank debt in 1 year, then only the equity issue is 
included in the multivariate analyses. Results are robust, irrespective of how combinations of equity and bank debt issues in 1 year are treated. Tangible and 
intangible assets are the ratio of respectively tangible and intangible assets to total assets. Cash flow is the ratio of internally generated cash flows relative to total 
assets. Bankruptcy risk is a short-term risk indicator developed for Belgian firms, ranging from zero for financially healthy firms to 1 for firms in financial 
distress. Debt ratio is measured as total debt, relative to total assets. Notional debt ratio is calculated as follows: if debt is issued, then the notional debt ratio 
equals the debt ratio; if equity is issued, then the new equity issue is added to the existing debt to calculate the notional debt ratio. Relative issue size is the ratio 
of issue size to pre-issue total assets. Absolute issue size is the absolute amount of the issue (in € th). Firm size is measured as total assets (in € th). 
Price/Earnings measured per year, is the price/earnings for the Belgian market. LTinterest measured per year is the 10-year benchmark Belgian government bond 
yield. Firms are split in 3 groups according to the type of initial venture capitalist: independent, captive or government related venture capitalist. Independent VC 
equals 1 if the firm is initially financed by an independent venture capitalist and 0 otherwise. Captive VC equals 1 if the firm is initially financed by a captive 
venture capitalist and 0 otherwise. Industry dummies, based on the 1-digit NACE code are included (not reported). 
(1)
  Sign.: Significance level (1-sided): * 0.05 ≤ p < 0.10; ** 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05;*** p <0 
